Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has vowed to strengthen ties with Pakistan by following the diplomatic path of his predecessor, the late Ebrahim Raisi. However, his commitment masks deep-rooted issues that have long undermined positive relations between the two countries – chief among them, conflict in Balochistan and the Islamic Republic’s rapidly escalating interference in Pakistani affairs. By promising continuity, Pezeshkian both sets the stage for future tensions and reveals the limits of presidential power in the Islamic Republic.
Pezeshkian’s promise of continuity is a strategic misstep, given the failure of Raisi’s approach to Pakistan. Despite asserting that improving bilateral relations was a key priority, Raisi’s tenure was marked by escalating tensions, particularly evident in Balochistan – a cross-border region that has long been the site of ethno-religious conflict and severe repression on both sides. As both Pakistan and Iran continue their parallel decades-long counter-insurgency campaigns in Balochistan, each side has repeatedly blamed the other for harboring terrorists, failing to control the border, and undermining regional security. This rhetoric continued to inhibit operational coordination and prompted violations of sovereignty.
In January 2024, these issues reached a dramatic breaking point. Without warning, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched unilateral missile and drone strikes against targets on Pakistani soil, prompting retaliation, the suspension of diplomatic relations, and fear of widening hostilities.
The Islamic Republic’s efforts to interfere in Pakistan’s affairs also accelerated under Raisi. The Zainebiyoun, a militia comprised of Pakistani Shias manufactured by the IRGC, expanded in size and scope and emerged as a vehicle for the Islamic Republic’s interests. In recent years, the Zainebiyoun has conducted assassinations, fanned sectarian violence, and laundered money on the regime’s behalf – prompting Islamabad to designate the militia as a terrorist organization in April 2024. The IRGC has also orchestrated radicalization efforts and espionage operations in Pakistan with increasing impunity.
Raisi’s overtures toward mending ties not long before his death largely amounted to empty gestures that sought to obfuscate these foundational issues. His high-profile state visit in April resulted in superficial agreements, including eight memoranda of understanding aimed at promoting cooperation in various sectors and establishing “free trade zones” on the Iran-Pakistan border. Regime officials claimed that these agreements will expand bilateral trade five-fold in the coming years and increase direct flights from Iran to Pakistan.
Fanfare surrounding these outcomes belied the fact that this approach has already been attempted with little success. Over the last decade, the Islamic Republic has signed numerous memoranda of understanding with Pakistan, on the same topics addressed during Raisi’s visit.
In one of the most egregious examples of empty gestures between Tehran and Islamabad, a joint gas pipeline project initiated in 2010 remains stalled nearly a decade-and-a-half later. Though Raisi pressured his counterparts on this issue and Pakistani officials claimed that construction would begin, progress appears unlikely. The United States continues to threaten Islamabad with sanctions, and the tenuous military-backed government relies on the Biden administration’s tacit support.
Furthermore, establishing free-trade zones on the border has been a perennial failure, and Iran lacks the capacity to increase flights and transit links with Pakistan to a significant degree.
Despite their failure, Raisi and his counterparts deliberately emphasized these agreements to avoid addressing the more significant challenges facing bilateral relations – which would have required challenging the IRGC’s authority. As a result, Raisi did not pursue cooperation on the conflict in Balochistan aside from issuing a broad statement on the importance of finding common cause for “anti-terrorism” operations. This was overshadowed by Iranian forces shooting Pakistani citizens along the border a month later.
The Zainebiyoun also went undiscussed, even as Raisi was accompanied by Ahmad Vahidi, an IRGC general who was once responsible for overseeing the Quds Force, which now controls the militia. By leaving these issues unaddressed, it is certain that they will remain a source of tension.
Pezeshkian’s decision not to change course from this flawed diplomatic approach all but guarantees that Iran-Pakistan relations will continue to face difficulties in the long run.
That said, Pezeshkian is left with little choice – his foreign policy toward Pakistan is limited by more powerful forces within the Islamic Republic. Security policy remains under the control of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC. Like the rest of his agenda as president, Raisi readily crafted his policies toward Pakistan in a manner that aligned with these forces.
Changing course on these issues would not benefit the political interests of the IRGC. Cooperating with Pakistan to bring peace to Balochistan would deprive the paramilitary of a means to inflame ethnic tensions – an important political cudgel for the regime to conflate dissent with terrorism, separatism, and foreign interference. Despite Pezeshkian making vague promises to improve conditions in Balochistan, it is unlikely that he will be able to implement meaningful change. Although these circumstances may enhance the IRGC’s domestic strength, violence continues to roil Iranian Balochistan, particularly along the border, risking an eventual repeat of January’s crisis.
Additionally, though he will chair the Supreme National Security Council, the president has no authority over the IRGC’s foreign activities. This will make it impossible for him to curtail the paramilitary’s interference operations in Pakistan – even if he wants to. It is probable that the IRGC will seek to exploit mounting insecurity and political instability, seeing an opportunity to expand its recruitment efforts and other operations in Pakistan in the coming months. Despite the inevitability of further tensions, Pezeshkian lacks the authority to alter the IRGC’s ambitions to wield influence within Pakistan’s fraught political system.
Ultimately, neither Pezeshkian’s ascension last month nor Raisi’s feint in April altered the existing trajectory of relations between Tehran and Islamabad. Structural challenges will continue to impede the expansion of economic and political ties, with the pursuit of short-term half-measures and obfuscation failing as a long-term diplomatic strategy. With Balochistan plagued by violence and the Iranian regime poised to intervene further in Pakistani affairs, bilateral relations will continue to deteriorate.
With the new administration in Iran set to maintain the status quo instead of seeking a diplomatic reset and addressing structural issues, the stage is set for future conflict. Given the wider region’s growing instability, Iran’s warming relationship with India, and China’s long-standing influence in Pakistan, the implications of such a conflict could be stark.
