The Army Profession: Reconnecting with our Sense of Duty

by Daniel Blackmon

In early December, I was fortunate enough to sit in on a presentation on the profession of arms, given by General (ret.) David Perkins. He asked: “The Army Profession…do we actually have a profession or do we have a bureaucracy?” 

While there is no doubt some bureaucracy in our military system, Perkins noted that there is a difference between having bureaucracy and being a bureaucracy. He defined bureaucracies as how to do things. He noted that typically, bureaucracies are built around organizations where people do jobs, have tasks, and are motivated by pay, their boss, time off, or certain benefits. We can all imagine why that would not work well in the military. Employees with jobs are motivated by metrics. Instead, professionals are motivated out of duty.

If we take motivation as the differentiator between a bureaucracy and a profession, the question should then become—where, as an Army, are we now? 

I believe some leaders have strayed into more of a focus on metrics-first instead of duty-first environment. I offer that our profession of arms is a vocation that requires consistent preparation and constant improvement, is made up of people that live by a certain code of ethics that allow us to hold each other accountable and, if required, that we can perform significant acts of disciplined violence to protect our National interests. We are motivated by a sense of duty.

Below are two examples of how metrics, if pursued incorrectly, can derail a unit’s ability to perform its warfighting mission and strip away at the sense of duty we should seek to collectively attain.

First, take a basic rifle range. The most important metric coming out of a rifle range is the number of Soldiers who qualified, with the goal being 100%. Many units report that number, are happy with it, and move out to the next training event. But what that number doesn’t indicate is the culture within the unit. Some will look at the number of experts and based on that number, will decide on how good they are.

I would argue that while a large number of expert shooters could be an indicator, it also isn’t a comprehensive measure of weapons-related readiness. To really understand the unit’s readiness to fight, one must look at more than just the end number. Other questions that should be asked are: How many times did it take each Soldier to qualify? What did their training schedule look like leading up to the range? Who was the driving force behind the excellence? Did a platoon sergeant or squad leader take the time to coach, teach and mentor the younger Soldiers? Even deeper: did every Soldier understand that their own personal lethality was tied to the overall well-being of the unit? 

So, while on the surface the statistic may look good, is this really a cohesive combat unit? There can be a big gap between a unit that briefs they had 100% of the Soldiers qualified from one that is ready to fight. That difference lies in the culture of the unit and whether those Soldiers understand the “why” behind what they’re doing—whether they believe in that “why”. In this case, it is our jobs as leaders to focus on lethality through marksmanship, instead of focusing on the qualification rate at the end of the range. Ask your non-commissioned officers if those Soldiers who came off the range are “lethal” and you will likely have your answer.

The second example is one that happened to a friend of mine. When he took command of his unit, it was at a 90% operational readiness (OR) rate, a measure of how well maintained their vehicle and equipment fleet is. They were combat ready on paper. But when he instituted a disciplined maintenance plan where Soldiers and leaders were in the motor pool, pulling out the maintenance manuals, and actually running their vehicles and doing the job correctly, their OR rate plummeted. There were a variety of reasons given to him for why they were at 90% on paper and yet far below that in reality- like that if parts they ordered took a while to arrive, they just wrote that the vehicle was working again in the meantime so it didn’t look bad for the unit. He stopped those practices and required the statistics to reflect his fleet, regardless of how it reflected on the unit. He shifted the unit’s focus to combat lethality and not OR metrics. It required his willingness to protect his unit from the higher leadership’s frustration at the metrics while they fixed the fleet. But it changed the culture and it changed their readiness. They got their OR rate to a real 90% and kept it there. It’s not always easy to focus on the “why”- it requires leaders to accept the reality of where their unit is and take risks, but it is worth it for the culture it creates. The difference between a unit that is doing its job and a professional unit is one that builds a culture of excellence, not a culture of metrics. 

So how do we create the right cultures in our own units- professions and not bureaucracies? We focus on the “why”. We write, read, and have meaningful discussions in professional forums where we challenge each other’s assumptions. We must spend time looking at ourselves and the units we serve in. If we are doing well, how do we export that across the rest of the formation? It is a never-ending journey to a professional force but we have to recognize where each individual starts from and be committed to helping them on their path. We do not want to be a bureaucracy full of people who know how to navigate the system. We want to be a profession defined by our culture of excellence that doesn’t accept bureaucracy as the status quo.

I want to dialogue with you on our culture and our profession. I challenge you to respond to one of the topics below. 

1. The profession: read this chapter of The Armed Forces Officer, available through National Defense University Press, and let me know what you agree and disagree with.
2. Creating the culture: Do you think unit culture is involved in producing people with a strong sense of duty? Think for example of the Medal of Honor, which highlights when an individual service member puts duty above all else, to include care for their own life. Where do medal of honor recipients “come from” and what is the role of organizational culture in producing them?
3. Share your story: write something that makes you better, and by extension, improves the the profession. It doesn’t have to be published, you don’t even have to show it to anyone, but the exercise will do you some good.

I am easy to reach. My email is daniel.d.blackmon.mil@army.mil. I welcome the discussion and look forward to meaningful engagement on the subjects.

COL Dan Blackmon is an active duty Army Field Artillery officer and a veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan. He has earned degrees from West Point, U.S. Naval War College, National War College, and was a Senior Fellow at MIT Seminar XXI. COL Blackmon has commanded at the battery, battalion and brigade level and is currently serving in the TRADOC HQ at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia.

(U.S. Army photo by Maj. John Farmer)